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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Victor Rene Arvizu appeals from the district court’s order revoking probation 
and executing the sentence previously imposed upon Arvizu’s convictions for two 
counts of battery on jail staff.  
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 Arvizu pled guilty to two counts of battery on certain personnel (jailer), for 
which the district court placed him on a five-year period of probation with an 
underlying unified sentence of five years with the first year fixed.  (R., pp.80-85.) 
Subsequently, a report of probation violation was filed alleging Arvizu had violated 
the terms of his probation by failing to obtain a mental health evaluation as directed 
by his probation officer and by failing to take all prescribed medications.  (R., pp.87-
88.)  
 Arvizu denied the violations and the matter went to evidentiary hearing where 
the court found insufficient evidence to find Arvizu had violated the second condition 
but concluded there was substantial evidence to find Arvizu had violated the first by 
failing to obtain a mental health assessment as directed by his probation officer.  
(4/3/15 Tr., p.40, L.15 – p.41, L.2.)   
 At the disposition hearing, the court determined that, in light of Arvizu’s 
ongoing position that he did not “believe [he had] any mental-health condition that 
need[ed] to be addressed,” it was unable to “conclude that [Arvizu did not] present a 
risk to the community presently” and revoked his probation.  (4/10/15 Tr., p.16-20.) 




Arvizu states the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion in revoking Mr. Arvizu’s 
probation?   
 
2. In revoking Mr. Arvizu’s probation, did the district court violate 
Mr. Arvizu’s constitutional rights to due process and equal 
protection?  
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.) 
 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Has Arvizu failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
revoking his probation? 
 
2. Has Arvizu failed to show that the district court committed fundamental, 































Arvizu Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Revoking His Probation 
 
A. Introduction 
Arvizu contends that the district court abused its discretion in revoking his 
probation.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-13.)  Specifically, Arvizu contends that the district 
court (1) failed to act consistently with applicable legal standards when it revoked his 
probation for what Arvizu contends was a non-willful violation, and (2) otherwise 
abused its discretion because, according to Arvizu, “the probation violation did not 
warrant revocation.”  (Appellants brief, pp.5-13.)  Arvizu’s claims fail because a 
review of the record reveals that the district court acted well within its discretion in 
revoking Arvizu’s probation.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State 
v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d 116, 120 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Drennen, 
122 Idaho 1019, 1021, 842 P.2d 698, 700 (Ct. App. 1992).  “When a trial court’s 
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-
tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue 
as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an 




“[A] district court’s finding of a probation violation will be upheld on appeal if 
there is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding.”  State v. Sanchez, 
149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009).  An appellate court will accept the 
district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous but “may freely 
review the district court’s application of constitutional principles in light of the facts 
found.”  Id. at 104, 233 P.3d at 35 (citations omitted).  
“The construction and application of legislative enactments and, by analogy, 
court rules are questions of law over which [this Court] exercise[s] free review.”  
Hansen v. State, 138 Idaho 865, 868, 71 P.3d 464, 467 (Ct. App. 2003).  
 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion With Respect To The 
Probation Violation Allegation That Arvizu Failed To Obtain A Mental Health 
Evaluation At The Direction Of His Probation Officer  
 
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and 
conditions of the probation have been violated.  I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. 
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams,115 
Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989). When deciding whether to 
revoke probation, the district court must consider “whether the probation [was] 
achieving the goal of rehabilitation and [was] consistent with the protection of 
society.”  Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 1022, 842 P.2d 698, 701. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(f)1 provides, in relevant part: 
                                                     
1 Effective July 31, 2015, Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e) was renumbered as I.C.R. 33(f).  
This amendment did not change the language of this subsection, which was 
substantively amended in 2012.  See 4/23/14 Order “In Re: Amendment of Idaho 
Criminal Rule (I.C.R.) 33.”   
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The court shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission by the 
defendant or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the defendant 
willfully violated a condition of probation.  
 
Therefore, the plain language of I.C.R. 33(f) purports to divest a district court of its 
authority to revoke a defendant’s probation unless the court finds that the defendant 
willfully violated a condition of his probation.  Prior to the 2012 amendment to this 
rule which added this requirement, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that where a 
defendant’s probation violations were not willful, a district court could still choose to 
revoke probation, but only after first considering “whether adequate alternative 
methods of punishing the defendant [were] available.”  State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 
378, 381-383, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340-1342 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Bearden v. Georgia, 
461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983)).  
 In this case, the state’s report of probation violation alleged that Arvizu 
violated his probation by failing to complete a mental health evaluation and failing to 
stay on prescribed medications.  (R., p.85.)  On appeal, Arvizu contends that the 
district court erred by failing to apply I.C.R. 33(f) with respect to the first allegation 
pertaining to his failure to obtain a mental health evaluation.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-
10.) 
 Arvizu’s claim fails for two reasons.  First, a review of the record reveals 
substantial evidence that Arvizu’s failure to obtain a previously ordered mental health 
evaluation was based upon Arvizu’s own willful conduct.  Thus, this violation justified 
the district court’s revocation of probation pursuant to I.C.R. 33(f).  Additionally, even 
if Arvizu’s probation violation was not willful, Arvizu is still not entitled to relief 
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because the district court had authority under a number of statutes to revoke 
Arvizu’s probation, regardless of whether the violation was willful.   
1. Arvizu’s Failure To Obtain A Mental Health Evaluation Constituted A 
Willful Probation Violation 
 
Even assuming that I.C.R. 33(f) divested the district court of its authority to 
revoke Arvizu’s probation absent the finding of a willful violation, Arvizu cannot show 
that the district court ultimately erred in revoking his probation because there is 
substantial evidence in the record that Arvizu’s failure to obtain a mental health 
evaluation was based upon willful conduct.   
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that 
Arvizu violated his probation by “failing to complete a mental health assessment as 
lawfully instructed by his probation officer.”  (4/30/15 Tr., p.40, Ls.15-19.)  Although 
the court did not expressly find that the violation was willful, it did conclude that 
Arvizu was directed by his probation officer to obtain a new mental health evaluation 
and he did not.   (4/30/15 Tr., p.38, L.5 – p.40, L.19.)   Substantial evidence in the 
record indicates that this violation was willful.  At the evidentiary hearing, Arvizu’s 
probation officer testified that Arvizu repeatedly told the probation officer that he did 
not believe he had any mental health concerns and in fact believed that there was 
“nothing wrong with him.”  (4/3/2015 Tr., p.13, Ls.3-13, p.16, Ls.13-15.)  Arvizu’s 
probation officer testified at the evidentiary hearing that Arvizu did not obtain a 
mental health evaluation: 
Q. (by the state)  And at some point, did you request that he go 
get a mental health assessment? 
 
A. (P.O. Justin Volle)  Yes, I did.  Specifically on May 22, 2014, I 
instructed him to go to the VA, obtain a mental health assessment.  
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This is following several other circumstances of his failure to obtain a 
mental health evaluation.  
 
Q.  Okay.  What other attempts did you make to have him get 
this evaluation? 
 
A.  Well, there was several times that we discussed his mental 
health.  We had a sit-down meeting with a VA representative.  His 
name was Joshua Bodie.  He is a professional at the VA helping with 
VA liaison stuff in setting up mental health assessments.  
 
 His recommendation was that Mr. Arvizu obtain a new mental 
evaluation other than the previous one that he completed when he was 
– his first day at State Hospital South.  So that’s where we went from 
that.  
 
 On May 22, 2014, I instructed his to get a new mental health 
assessment.  This was the result of a disagreement between myself 
and Mr. Arvizu about his mental condition.   
 
 He expressed concern to me that the report from State Hospital 
South was not accurate, and he indeed did not need to take 
medication.  
 
 In response to this, I agreed and instructed him to obtain a new 
mental health assessment upon which that would be the medication 
that I would instruct him to take. 
 
Q.  And did he go get this assessment? 
 
A.  He did not.  
 
(4/3/15 Tr., p.12, L.8 – p.13, L.15.)  When Arvizu ultimately appeared for the 
evaluation, he did not obtain one because of his desire not to complete it:  “At the 
time he said he went to the VA, but when they tried – for the evaluation, but when he 
told them that I made him go, then they would not administer the evaluation.”  
(4/3/15 Tr., p.21, Ls.2-5.) 
Contrary to Arvizu’s argument on appeal that the failure to obtain a mental 
health evaluation “was a condition beyond his control – he was not responsible or at 
 
8 
fault for being denied an evaluation” (Appellant’s brief, p.9), the court correctly 
determined that Arvizu was responsible for the denial of an evaluation.  The report of 
probation violation is consistent with this conclusion,  
On May 22, 2014, Mr. Arivizu [sic] was instructed, by his supervising 
probation officer, to complete a mental health assessment.  Mr. Arvizu 
was provided information to obtain a free mental health assessment 
through the Department of Veteran’s Affairs.  Upon attending his 
scheduled appointment with the Department of Veteran’s Affairs, he 
stated that he told them “I don’t want to do this and my P.O. is making 
me.”  Because of these statements, the Department of Veteran’s Affairs 
did not complete the mental health assessment.  
 
(R., pp.87-88.)   Arvizu reported to his probation officer that he had not completed an 
assessment.  (R., p.88.)  His probation officer gave Arvizu another opportunity to 
obtain the mental health assessment, but Arvizu declined to take advantage of this 
opportunity – likely because he believed there was “nothing wrong with him.”  (R., 
p.88.) 
At the disposition hearing, the district court, without citing to I.C.R. 33(f) did 
appear to address the willfulness question when discussing with Arvizu his failure to 
obtain a new assessment as directed by his probation officer: 
You were asked, you were instructed to get a mental-health 
assessment from the VA and you – you blocked it effectively from 
happening by going there and telling the VA that you were there 
against your will, or you weren’t, you know, you were being told to do it.  
You didn’t want to do it, and so it didn’t happen.  
 
(4/10/15 Tr., p.16, Ls.9-15 (emphasis added).)   
Thus, even assuming that I.C.R. 33(f) divested the district court of its authority 
to revoke Arvizu’s probation absent the finding of a willful violation, Arvizu has failed 
to show error because the record demonstrates that his violation was in fact, willful.  
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2. The Court Acted Consistently With Governing Legal Standards In 
Revoking Arvizu’s Probation, Regardless of Whether The Violations 
Were Willful 
 
As discussed above, I.C.R. 33(f) purports to preclude a district court from 
exercising its authority to revoke a defendant’s probation unless it finds that the 
defendant willfully violated a condition of his probation.  However, the authority of a 
trial court to revoke probation is also governed by several statutes.  Among them, 
I.C. § 20-222(2) provides, in relevant part: 
At any time during probation or suspension of sentence, the court 
may issue a warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation or 
suspension of sentence and cause the defendant to be arrested. 
Thereupon the court, after summary hearing may revoke the probation 
and suspension of sentence and cause the sentence imposed to be 
executed, or may cause the defendant to be brought before it and may 
continue or revoke the probation, or may impose any sentence which 
originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction.  
 
Pursuant to the plain language of this statute, a court may revoke a defendant’s 
probation when the defendant has violated “any of the conditions of probation.”  I.C. 
§ 20-222 (emphasis added).  The statute does not contain any requirement that  the 
violation be “willful.”  Rather, the only limitation on the court’s authority to revoke 
probation imposed by this statute is that there actually be a violation of one or more 
conditions of probation. 
 Idaho Code §§ 19-2602 and 19-2603 similarly grant trial courts broad 
authority to revoke probation.  In fact, pursuant to those statutes, a court’s “authority 
to revoke the probation does not even depend upon [a] violation of any of the terms 
or conditions of the order.”  Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 482, 253 P.2d 794, 798 
(1953), quoted in Franklin v. State, 87 Idaho 291, 297, 392 P.2d 552, 554 (1964).  
Idaho Code § 19-2602 authorizes a district court to “issue a bench warrant for the 
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rearrest of the defendant” where “it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the 
terms and conditions upon which the defendant was placed on probation by the 
court…have been violated or for any other cause satisfactory to the court.”  Further, 
“[w]hen the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of 
probation,” Idaho Code § 19-2603 provides that the court “may, if judgment has been 
withheld, pronounce any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, or, if 
judgment was originally pronounced but suspended, revoke probation.” 
 Consistent with the plain language of I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222, 
Idaho’s appellate courts have recognized that the trial courts of this state have 
statutory authority to revoke probation in two circumstances: “(1) [upon] satisfactory 
proof of a violation of a probation condition, or (2) [for] ‘any other cause satisfactory 
to court.’”  State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311, 314, 766 P.2d 781, 784 (1988) (citing I.C. 
§§ 19-2602 and 20-222), quoted in State v. Buzo, 121 Idaho 324, 326, 824 P.2d 899, 
900 (Ct. App. 1991); see also Franklin, 87 Idaho at 297, 392 P.2d at 554; Ex parte 
Medley, 73 Idaho at 482, 253 P.2d at 798-99; State v. Hancock,111 Idaho 835, 727 
P.2d 1263 (Ct. App. 1986).  It is true that Idaho’s appellate courts have held that a 
trial court must consider alternatives to imprisonment before revoking a defendant’s 
probation based on a violation that is “not willful, or was beyond the probationer’s 
control.”  Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106, 233 P.3d at 37.  However, nothing in the 
relevant statutes actually prevents a trial court from revoking probation where the 
violation or other “cause satisfactory to the court” was not willful. 
 As discussed above, the plain language of I.C.R. 33(f) purports to divest a 
district court of its authority to revoke a defendant’s probation unless it finds that the 
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defendant willfully violated a condition of his probation.  The requirement is of no 
effect, however, because it directly conflicts with the broad authority to revoke 
probation granted by I.C. §§ 19-2602, 9-2603 and 20-222, and because a court’s 
authority to revoke probation is a matter of substantive, not procedural, law. 
 “When a statute and rule can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no 
conflict between them, they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a way 
that results in a conflict.”  State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 148 Idaho 706, 709, 228 P.3d 387, 
390 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 974, 188 P.3d 912, 916 
(2008)).  However, in this case, it simply is not possible to reasonably interpret I.C.R. 
33(f) in a way that does not conflict with I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222.  
Pursuant to the rule, a trial court “shall not revoke probation unless...the defendant 
willfully violated a condition of probation.”  I.C.R. 33(f).  The statutes, on the other 
hand, give the court broad authority to revoke probation upon proof of a violation of 
“any” of the probation conditions or “for any other cause satisfactory to the court.”  
I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603, 20-222. 
 Because it is not possible to reconcile the rule and the statutes, “this Court 
must determine whether the conflict is one of procedure or one of substance.” 
Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916; see also State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 
539, 540-41, 700 P.2d 942, 943-44 (1985); Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709, 228 P.3d at 
391.  “Substantive law issues are the province of the legislature, while matters of 
rulemaking and procedure are generally the province of the judiciary.”  Two Jinn, 148 
Idaho at 709, 228 P.3d at 390 (citing Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916; 
State v. Yoder, 96 Idaho 651, 654, 534 P.2d 771, 774 (1975)).  Thus, if the conflict 
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between a statute and a criminal rule relates to matters of procedure, the criminal 
rule will prevail.  Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916 (citing State v. Beam, 
121 Idaho 862, 863, 828 P.2d 891, 892 (1992)); Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709, 228 
P.3d at 390.  “Conversely, in matters of substantive law, the statute applies.”  Two 
Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709-10, 228 P.3d at 390-91 (citing Beam, 121 Idaho at 864, 828 
P.2d at 893). 
 In determining whether a conflict relates to matters of substantive law or, 
instead, to matters of procedure, the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the 
following general guidelines: 
Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct and 
punishments for violations thereof.  It thus creates, defines, 
and regulates primary rights. In contrast, practice and 
procedure pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of 
the courts by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are 
effectuated. 
 
Currington, 108 Idaho at 541, 700 P.2d at 944 (quoting State v. Smith, 527 P.2d 674, 
676-77 (Wash. 1974)); accord Beam, 121 Idaho at 863-64, 828 P.2d at 892-93; 
Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916; Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 710, 228 P.3d at 
391. 
 Applying these guidelines in Johnson, the Idaho Supreme Court determined 
that any conflict between I.C.R. 7(b) – which requires a charging document to allege 
the “essential facts constituting the offense charged” – and I.C. § 19-1430 – which 
abolished the distinction between accessories and principals such that “no other 
facts need be alleged in any indictment against such an accessory than are required 
in an indictment against his principal” – was a matter of substantive law.  Johnson, 
145 Idaho at 974-75, 188 P.3d at 916-17.  Specifically, the Court explained: 
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The Legislature’s definition of principal and abolishment of the 
distinction between principal and accessories does not pertain 
to mechanical operations of the courts; the Legislature is 
creating, defining, and regulating primary rights. Thus, I.C. § 
19-1430 is substantive and does not overlap with this Court’s 
power to create procedural rules. Therefore, even if I.C. § 19-
1430 and I.C.R. 7(b) were in conflict, the statute would prevail. 
 
Johnson,145 Idaho at 974-75, 188 P.3d at 916-17. 
 Similarly, in Beam, the Court held that a statute requiring a defendant in a 
death penalty case to file a challenge to his or sentence within 42 days prevailed 
over I.C.R. 35, which permits a challenge to an illegal sentence at any time.  Beam, 
121 Idaho at 864, 828 P.2d at 893.  The Court reasoned that, given the unique 
nature of the death penalty, the statute “creates, defines, and regulates a primary 
right” and, as such, was a matter of substantive law.  Id. 
 Like the statutes at issue in Johnson and Beam, the statutes granting trial 
courts authority to revoke probation upon proof of a violation of any of the conditions 
of probation or “for any other cause satisfactory to the court” are substantive in 
nature.  It is well settled that probation, itself, “is not a matter of right; it may be 
granted the defendant through exercise of sound discretion by the trial court within 
the ambit of authority conferred by the legislature.”  Franklin, 87 Idaho at 297, 392 
P.2d at 554.  Because a trial court’s power to place a defendant on probation only 
exists as a function of the legislature’s power to enact substantive law, it follows that 
a court’s authority to revoke probation is likewise a matter exclusively within the 
province of the legislature.  See id. at 300-301, 392 P.2d at 557 (citations omitted) 
(“The legislatures of the several states have the exclusive and inherent power to 
define, prohibit and punish any act as a crime within the limits of the federal and 
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respective state constitutions.”).  Indeed, a review of Idaho Code §§ 19-2602, 19-
2603 and 20-222 shows they do not merely prescribe the mechanical procedure a 
court must follow in revoking probation. Instead, they actually define and regulate 
the circumstances under which a legislatively authorized grant of probation may be 
revoked. 
 Because the authority of a court to revoke probation is a matter of substantive 
law, the statutes granting the trial courts of this state that authority must “‘be given 
due deference and respect,’” Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916 (quoting In 
re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 614, 623 (1995)). 
Accordingly, to the extent I.C.R. 33(f) purports to divest trial courts of the authority 
granted to them by the legislature to revoke probation upon proof of a violation of 
any probation condition or for “any other cause satisfactory to the court,” the rule is 
of no effect.  In light of Arvizu’s violation of an express condition of his probation, the 
district court had authority under I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222 to revoke 
Arvizu’s probation, regardless of whether the violation was willful.  
 
D. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Declining To Reinstate 
 Arvizu On Probation 
 
Arvizu contends that the district court erred because, he asserts, “failing to 
obtain an evaluation did not warrant revocation of Mr. Arvizu’s probation when the 
record was clear that Mr. Arvizu was otherwise compliant and doing well on 
probation.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.10.)  Arvizu has failed to demonstrate that the district 
court abused its discretion.   
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Arvizu appears to argue that, because he was “doing exceptionally well on 
probation,” did not have prior felony convictions, and “served in the military many 
years ago,” the court was not justified in revoking his probation based upon a 
“potential threat” to the community.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-13.)  Arvizu 
oversimplifies the situation presented to the court.  
Arvizu pled guilty to two counts of battery on jailers and had been recently 
released from a commitment to a state mental health facility.  (R., pp.87-88.)  
Because Arvizu was adamant that he had no mental health concerns, his probation 
officer ordered him to obtain a current mental health assessment.  (4/3/15 Tr., p.12, 
L.8 – p.18, L.15.)  Failing to obtain the assessment is potentially indicative of Arvizu’s 
failure to follow conditions of his probation in the future.  Additionally, it is clear from 
the record that Arvizu does in fact have a history of mental health concerns.   (See, 
R., pp.107-112.)  These factors, bolstered by Arvizu’s rambling explanation to the 
court about why there is absolutely nothing wrong with his mental health (4/10/15 Tr., 
p.5, L.25 – p.14, L.12), were sufficient to cause the court concern that Arvizu was a 
potential threat to the community and not a suitable candidate for probation.   
 Arvizu has failed to demonstrate that the district court’s decision not to 
reinstate him on probation constituted an abuse of discretion.  This Court should 
therefore affirm the district court’s order revoking probation and ordering the original 





Arvizu Has Failed To Demonstrate Fundamental Constitutional Error With Regard To 
The District Court’s Sentencing Determination 
 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal Arvizu contends the district court “violated [his] 
rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
Article I, Sections 2 and 13 because, had Mr. Arvizu not been diagnosed with a 
mental health condition, he would have remained on probation.”  (Appellant’s brief, 
p.13.)   A review of the record reveals that Arvizu has failed to establish any 
constitutional error, let alone clear and obvious fundamental error.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The appellate courts of this state will only review unpreserved assertions of 
error under the fundamental error doctrine.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 
P.3d 961, 978 (2010).   
 
C. The District Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Constitutional Error In Its 
 Sentencing Determination 
 
Because Arvizu failed to raise a constitutional challenge to his sentence in the 
district court, he must demonstrate fundamental error on appeal.  Perry, 150 Idaho 
at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.  To do so, Arvizu must demonstrate: (1) a constitutional 
violation; (2) that the violation is clear and obvious without the need for additional 
information not contained in the appellate record; and (3) that prejudice resulted.  Id.   
Arvizu cannot make such a showing. 
In State v. Todd, 147 Idaho 321, 208 P.3d 303 (Ct. App. 2009), the Idaho 
Court of Appeals analyzed a due process and equal protection challenge to a district 
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court’s discretionary sentencing determination.  Specifically, the Court considered 
whether the district court violated Todd’s constitutional rights by considering his 
inability to pay restitution as a factor in imposing a prison sentence.  Id.  The Court 
sought first to determine whether to analyze the claim as a due process or equal 
protection challenge.  Id.  Quoting from Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), 
the Court of Appeals reasoned: 
[W]e generally analyze the fairness of relations between the 
criminal defendant and the State under the Due Process Clause, while 
we approach the question of whether the State has invidiously denied 
one class of defendants a substantial benefit available to another class 
of defendants under the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
 … 
A due process approach has the advantage in this context of 
directly confronting the intertwined question of the role that a 
defendant’s financial background can play in determining an 
appropriate sentence. When the court is initially considering what 
sentence to impose, a defendant’s level of financial resources is a 
point on a spectrum rather than a classification.  Since indigency in this 
context is a relative term rather than a classification, fitting “the 
problem of this case into an equal protection framework is a task too 
Procrustean to be rationally accomplished,” North Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 U.S. 711, 723, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2079, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 668 (1969). 
The more appropriate question is whether consideration of a 
defendant’s financial background in setting or resetting a sentence is 
so arbitrary or unfair as to be a denial of due process. 
 
Todd, 147 Idaho at 322-323, 208 P.3d at 304-305 (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665, 
666 n.8).  The Court of Appeals subsequently analyzed Todd’s challenge under the 
due process clause.  Id. 
Similarly, in deciding to revoke probation in this case, the district court did not 
create a classification; it instead analyzed the relationship between points on a 
spectrum – the danger posed by Arvizu to the community against Arvizu’s refusal to 
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obtain a mental health evaluation and his complete denial that he had any mental 
health concerns despite his recent commitment to a state mental facility and his 
concerning discourse with the court on the matter.  (See generally, 4/3/15 Tr., p.5, 
L.24 – p.14, L.12.)   Therefore, Arvizu’s claim should be interpreted as raising a due 
process challenge, i.e., whether the court’s consideration of the suitability of Arvizu 
for probation in the context of Arvizu’s disabilities and the danger he posed to the 
community was “so arbitrary or unfair as to be a denial of due process.”2   Arvizu 
cannot show that the district court’s analysis of these factors constituted a due 
process violation, let alone clear and obvious fundamental constitutional error.    
The primary underlying purpose of probation is rehabilitation.  See State v. 
Wilson, 127 Idaho 506, 510, 903 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct. App. 1995).  It is therefore prudent 
and appropriate for a sentencing court to consider arguments and evidence 
regarding whether or not a defendant might be successful on probation in light of 
both the particular characteristics of the offender and the rehabilitation opportunities 
available in the community.   
  In this case, the district court’s consideration of Arvizu’s suitability for 
probation based on the evidence presented to it was entirely reasonable, and not 
arbitrary or unfair.  Having recognized that Arvizu was potentially a candidate for 
continued probation – assuming a theoretical situation wherein he received an 
updated mental health assessment and followed any recommended treatment plan – 
                                                     
2 The state also asserts that Arvizu failed to demonstrate fundamental error if his 
claim is interpreted as raising an equal protection claim.  For the same reasons as 
discussed below, the district court’s drawing of “classifications” (between defendants 
with mental health conditions and those without) in this case was rationally related to 
the legitimate state interest of protecting the community. 
 
19 
the court was not then constitutionally required to continue Arvizu on probation 
where the existence and scope of his mental illness had not been determined or 
addressed.  It is not constitutionally arbitrary or unfair for a district court to utilize its 
sentencing discretion in a manner that takes into account the realities and limitations 
of community supervision options. 
Arvizu has cited no case contrarily holding that such considerations violate 
the due process clause.  State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 606, 167 P.3d 357 (Ct. App. 
2007), is instructive.  After Braaten completed his second period of retained 
jurisdiction, the district court declined to place Braaten on probation, and instead 
relinquished jurisdiction.  Id. at 607-608, 167 P.3d at 357-358.  The district court 
explained that it was concerned about whether society would be adequately 
protected if Braaten were on probation when, because of his indigence, he would not 
be able to obtain proper housing and treatment.  Id. at 607, 167 P.3d at 358.   In 
other words, the district court based its sentencing determination on whether suitable 
housing and treatment were available to Braaten. 
On appeal, Braaten asserted that the district court violated his equal 
protection and due process rights by considering his indigence in denying him 
probation.  Id. at 606, 167 P.3d at 357.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court’s sentencing determination.  Id. at 607-610, 167 P.3d at 358-361.  The Court 
recognized that the state had a “strong and legitimate interest in protecting society 
from criminals and, therefore, in disallowing probation for an offender if the offender 
cannot be adequately supervised or if his conditional release will present an undue 
risk to society.”  Id. at 610, 167 P.3d at 361.  The Court held that the means used to 
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protect that interest – the denial of probation for Braaten due to his indigence – was 
directly and rationally related to the interest, and therefore did not offend 
constitutional due process or equal protection principles.  Id.    
Similarly, in the present case, the state’s strong and legitimate interest in 
protecting society was furthered by the denial of probation based upon Arvizu’s 
failure to follow his probation officer’s order to obtain an updated mental health 
evaluation.  Like Braaten, who was denied probation not because of his lack of 
resources per se, but because of the effect of that lack of resources on the likelihood 
that he could be adequately supervised, Arvizu was denied probation not because of 
his mental disability per se, but because of the effect of his untreated mental health 
issues and resulting likelihood that he could be adequately supervised and the 
community protected if he were placed on probation. 
Arvizu has failed to establish that the district court’s sentencing determination 
constituted a violation of his constitutional due process rights, let alone clear and 
obvious fundamental error.  This Court should therefore affirm the district court’s 






 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order 
revoking probation and executing the sentence previously imposed upon Arvizu’s 
convictions for two counts of battery on jail staff.  




       /s/ Nicole L. Schafer__________________ 
      NICOLE L. SCHAFER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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